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  Abstract 
This study investigates loss aversion when the reference point is a state-dependent random 
variable. This case describes, for example, a money manager being evaluated relative to a 
risky benchmark index rather than a fixed target return level. Using a state-dependent 
structure, prospects are more (less) attractive if they depend positively (negatively) on the 
reference point. In addition, the structure avoids an inherent aversion to risky prospects and 
yields no losses when the prospect and the reference point are the same. Related to this, the 
optimal reference-dependent solution equals the optimal consumption solution (no loss 
aversion) when the reference point is selected completely endogenously. Given that loss 
aversion is widespread, we conclude that the reference point generally includes an important 
exogenously fixed component. For example, the typical investment benchmark index is 
externally fixed by the investment principal for the duration of the investment mandate. We 
develop a choice model where adjustment costs cause stickiness relative to an initial 
exogenous reference point. 
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 1 Introduction
A key problem of reference-dependent choice theories is the specication of the relevant
reference point. Traditionally, the reference point is interpreted as an exogenously xed and
constant value, for example, the current wealth level of the decision maker. Recent studies
have examined risky choice with an endogenous and/or stochastic reference point. Shalev
(2000) allows the reference point to be determined endogenously as part of the decision-
maker's optimization problem. Sugden (2003) allows the reference point to be a random
variable rather than a constant; see also Schmidt, Starmer, and Sugden (2008). Using
a stochastic reference point is reminiscent of measuring the investment performance of a
money manager relative to a risky benchmark portfolio like the S&P 500 index rather than a
xed target return. K oszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) combine both ideas and use a reference
point that is both endogenous and stochastic. This paper analyzes an alternative model of
stochastic reference points. To simplify the exposition and discussion, and for the sake of
comparison, we largely adhere to the assumptions and terminology of K oszegi and Rabin
(2006, 2007), but our conclusions apply more generally.
The K oszegi and Rabin (2006) model basically builds on disappointment theory (see,
for example, Bell 1985, Loomes and Sugden 1986, Gul 1991, Cillo and Delqui e 2006). It
assumes that the decision maker compares every possible outcome of a given prospect with
every possible outcome of the reference point. The decision maker therefore experiences loss
(disappointment) when the outcome of the prospect in a given state-of-the-world falls below
1the outcome of the reference point in other states. By contrast, the Sugden (2003) model
builds on regret theory (Loomes and Sugden 1982, Bell 1982, 1983). The decision maker
compares the prospect and the reference point only in the same state and not across states
and experiences loss (regret) only if the outcome of the prospect falls below the outcome
of the reference point in the same state. For many applications, the latter, regret-based or
state-dependent preference structure seems more plausible than the former, disappointment-
based structure. For example, for the money manager who benchmarks against the market
index, the most relevant reference point for the realized portfolio value in a given period
seems to be the realized value of the market index in the same period, and the value in other
states-of-the-world seems less relevant. This study therefore examines loss aversion with a
state-dependent reference point and the endogenous selection of the reference point. The
analysis yields a number of surprising insights.
First, the disappointment-based structure implies that the decision maker is indierent
to the statistical dependency between the prospect and the reference point. A prospect that
is positively correlated with the reference point is seen as equally risky as an uncorrelated
or negatively correlated prospect. Intuitively, it seems that a prospect is more attractive if
it depends positively on the reference point and is less attractive in case of negative depen-
dence. For example, for the money manager who benchmarks against the market index, long
positions in stocks generally will feel safer and entail smaller gains and losses than holding
short positions in the same stocks, although the two positions yield a comparable univariate
risk prole. In fact, perfectly replicating the market index creates a perfectly positive de-
2pendence with the reference point and avoids all possible losses. The state-dependent model
captures this intuition, and a prospect that is positively correlated with the reference point
will appear to be safer and causes smaller losses, while a negative correlation will feel riskier
and yield larger losses.
Second, across-state comparison introduces an aversion to risky prospects, which will
yield losses even when the prospect and the reference point are the same. In many cases,
the reference point is exogenously xed (in part or in whole). For example, the reference
point may be set by an external principal, as is true for a benchmark index in an external in-
vestment mandate. Alternatively, the decision maker may adjust slowly to new information
or surprise events, for example, an unexpected change in the composition of the benchmark
index. In these cases, it seems natural that loss aversion inuences behavior and leads to
dierent behavior than a reference-independent model. By contrast, when the reference
point is completely endogenous, we may expect that it equals the optimal solution to the
reference-independent choice problem and therefore loss aversion does not inuence behav-
ior. However, this is not true for the disappointment-based model: reference-dependent
behavior generally deviates from reference-independent behavior, even if the reference point
is completely endogenous. By contrast, the optimal solution in the state-dependent model
equals the reference-independent solution if the reference point is fully endogenous. Loss
aversion inuences behavior only if the reference point includes an exogenous component
and the decision maker is not entirely free to select the reference-independent solution as
her reference point. Our model captures this exogenous component using costly adjustment
3from an initial, exogenous reference point.
Like K oszegi and Rabin (2006), our analysis does not account for subjective probabil-
ity weighting. Since probability weighting is known to be strong even for simple fty-fty
gambles with a constant reference point, it seems unlikely that a model with a stochastic
reference point is complete without accounting for this phenomenon. Fortunately, our argu-
ments in favour of a state-dependent reference point structure do not critically depend on
probability weighting.
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the stochastic reference point
model proposed by K oszegi and Rabin (2006). Section 3 introduces the state-dependent
stochastic reference point model and discusses its properties. Section 4 applies the two
stochastic reference point models to US investment benchmark data. Section 5 concludes.
The Appendix includes our formal proofs.
2 The Stochastic Reference Point Model
Throughout the text, we will use 
 for the state-space, P[A] for the probability that event
A  
 occurs, and X is the collection of feasible prospects X : 
 ! R (for instance, budget
feasible portfolio payos).
K oszegi and Rabin (2006) dene the reference-dependent utility of X 2 X given the ref-
erence point Y 2 X as follows:
4Denition 2.1.
(2.1) U(XjY ) =
Z Z
u(xjy)dFY(y)dFX(x)
where FX(x) = P[X  x] and FY(y) = P[Y  y] are the distribution functions of X and Y ,
respectively, and
(2.2) u(xjy) = 1 m(x) + 2 (m(x)   m(y));
m : R ! R is a continuously dierentiable, strictly increasing \consumption" utility func-
tion, and  : R ! R is a \universal" gain-loss utility function which satises the following
properties:
A0. (x) is continuous for all x and twice dierentiable for x 6= 0;
A1. (x) is strictly increasing;
A2. If y > x > 0, then (y) + ( y) < (x) + ( x);
A3. 00(x)  0 for x > 0 and 00(x)  0 for x < 0;
A4.
limx!0 0( jxj)
limx!0 0(jxj) =  > 1.
The parameters 1;2 2 R+ give the weights between consumption utility m and gain-
loss utility . K oszegi and Rabin (2006) assume 1 = 1. Our analysis will also use the
expected consumption utility M(X) =
R
m(x)dFX and the consumption certainty equivalent
C(X) = m 1(M(X)). If m(x) = x for all x and 1 = 0, the piecewise-power value function
of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) arises as a special case of Equation (2.1). Note that
for this specication of gain-loss utility, the curvature in the domain of losses should be
equal to the curvature in the domain of gains in order to obey Assumption A2, as shown
by K obberling and Wakker (2005). As discussed by K oszegi and Rabin (2007), the model
allows for consumption utility to dominate gain-loss utility for large-stake prospects. Hence,
the model can reconcile loss aversion for modest stakes with risk aversion for large stakes.
5Denition 2.1 does not account for subjective probability weighting. Since probability
weighting is known to be strong even for simple fty-fty gambles with a constant reference
point, it seems unlikely that the model is complete without accounting for this phenomenon.
To the best of our knowledge, the only model that includes probability weighting with a
stochastic reference point is by Schmidt, Starmer, and Sugden (2008), who dene cumulative
decision weights as in Cumulative Prospect Theory of Tversky and Kahneman (1992), i.e.,
they apply a weighting function to the cumulative and decumulative distribution of gains and
losses, respectively. However, to us it is not immediately clear how probability weighting
would enter in our model. Is consumption utility aected in the same way as gain-loss
utility? Are the probabilities of the evaluated prospect, FX, aected in the same way as the
probabilities of the reference point, FY? Since our arguments do not critically depend on
probability weighting, we leave these questions for further research.
It will be useful for our analysis to consider a stronger version of assumption A3:
A30. 00(x) = 0 for x 6= 0.1
This assumption does not allow for the piecewise-power function of Tversky and Kahne-
man (1992). However, it does allow for a piecewise-linear gain-loss function. Note that a
piecewise-linear gain-loss utility  does not imply piecewise-linear reference-dependent utility
u, because consumption utility m is not restricted.
In case of discrete distributions with S states of nature, i.e., 
 = f1;:::;Sg and ps =
6P[fsg], reference-dependent utility corresponds to:







The model combines every possible outcome of the prospect with every possible outcome
of the reference point and evaluates every combination at the product of the two marginal
probabilities. The double summation implies that the decision maker considers a total of
S2 combinations of outcomes for every pair of evaluated prospect and reference point. As
in disappointment theory, the decision maker experiences a loss (disappointment) when the
outcome of the prospect in a given state falls below the outcome of the reference point in
another state. The decision maker is therefore predicted to be indierent to the statistical
dependence between the prospect X and the reference point Y :
(2.4) U(XjY ) = U( ~ Xj~ Y )
for any ~ X and ~ Y which have the same marginal distributions as X and Y , irrespective of the
dependence structure. However, our intuition says that a prospect would appear less risky in
case of positive dependence and more risky in case of negative dependence, in the same way
as an investment portfolio with a positive market beta appears less risky than a negative-beta
portfolio to an investor who benchmarks against a market index. Indeed, indierence to the
dependence structure can lead to counterintuitive choices, as shown in the following example:
Example 2.1. Let 
 = f1;2g and P[f1g] = 1=2. We dene the risky prospects X and Y as
7follows:
X(1) = 0;X(2) = 101
Y (1) = 0;Y (2) = 100:
Suppose that m(x) = x, (x) = x if x  0 and (x) = x,  > 1, if x < 0, and 1 =
2 = 1. The decision maker faces the exogenous stochastic reference point Y . Faced with this
reference point, she faces a choice between the two risky prospects, Y and X. In this case,
X strictly dominates Y and the preference for X is obvious. Indeed, the relevant values for
expected reference-dependent utility are



















































and the decision maker is predicted to prefer X to Y . In this case, X and Y have a perfectly




Equation (2.3) does not account for dependencies and hence the decision maker is still pre-
dicted to prefer X0 to Y . However, it seems that a loss-averter would want to avoid the
situation (Y (2);X0(2)) = (100;0) by choosing Y .
Indierence to dependence structure is particularly dicult to understand when one eval-
uates a risky prospect that is also used as the reference point { \auto-evaluation". In this
case, a perfectly positive dependence arises and the decision maker will not experience any
losses in the sense of negative deviations from the reference point. For example, an investor
who benchmarks against a market index experiences no losses when she perfectly replicates
the index. However, the model predicts that the joint probabilities are not relevant and the
decision maker experiences losses (disappointment), even in case of auto-evaluation. This
contrasts with the original interpretation of the reference point as a \neutral" prospect, ac-
cording to which the decision maker experiences no gains or losses when she would selects this
8prospect; see Kahneman and Tversky (1979, Page 274). In general, auto-evaluating a risky
prospect yields losses and implies negative gain-loss utility. By contrast, auto-evaluating a
riskless prospect always avoids losses and yields zero gain-loss utility. This introduces an
inherent aversion to risky prospects and implies, among other things, that auto-evaluating a
risky prospect is always less favorable than auto-evaluating its consumption certainty equiv-
alent:
Lemma 2.1. For any Y 2 X we have
U(Y jY )  1 M(Y ); and (2.5)
U(Y jY ) = 1 M(Y ) if and only if Y is riskless. (2.6)
Consequently, if Y is stochastic and 2 > 0 then
U(Y jY ) < U(C(Y )jC(Y )):
Thus far, the reference point was exogenously given. K oszegi and Rabin (2006) develop
a framework to endogenously determine the reference point. They introduce the following
denitions:
Denition 2.2. A personal equilibrium (PE) is a prospect Y 2 X such that
U(Y jY )  U(XjY )
for all X 2 X. We denote by XPE  X the set of personal equilibria.
A preferred personal equilibrium (PPE) is a personal equilibrium with maximal reference-
dependent utility:
X 2 argmaxfU(ZjZ) : Z 2 XPEg:
If Y = 2 XPE is taken as reference point, the decision maker will nd a prospect X that
is preferred to Y , and will use X as the new reference point. Under assumption A30 on the
9gain-loss function, the change of reference point does not cause a preference reversal, i.e.,
X is preferred to Y also with respect to the new reference point (K oszegi and Rabin 2006,
Proposition 1.3). Therefore, the decision maker will replace the reference point with the
preferred prospect as long as a personal equilibrium has not been reached. The preferred
personal equilibrium is the personal equilibrium with maximal reference-dependent utility.
The aversion to risky prospects implies that any riskfree personal equilibrium is also a
preferred personal equilibrium:
Proposition 2.1. Let X 2 XPE be deterministic. Under assumption A30, X is a PPE.
This result demonstrates the counterintuitive implications of cross-state comparisons. It
also implies that a preferred personal equilibrium need not maximize consumption utility,
not even on the set of personal equilibria. Consider the following example:
Example 2.2. We assume the same setup of Example 2.1. Consider the choice between the
fty-fty gamble Y for 0 or 100, and a sure thing Z that pays z 2 [0;100] with full certainty.
Because consumption utility is assumed to be linear, Y is the consumption optimum if
z  50 and Z is the optimum if z  50. The rst step to implement the stochastic reference
point model is to compute the relevant expected reference-dependent utilities:




U(ZjY ) = z +
1
2
(z   0) +
1
2
(z   100) =
1
2
(3z + z   100)
U(Y jZ) = 50 +
1
2
 (0   z) +
1
2
(100   z) =
1
2
(200   z   z)
U(ZjZ) = z + (z   z) = z:
It follows directly that Y is a personal equilibrium (U(Y jY )  U(ZjY )) if z  50 and Z is
a personal equilibrium (U(ZjZ  U(Y jZ)) if z  200=(3 + ). Thus, for z < 200=(3 + )
10and z > 50, there exists a unique personal equilibrium, which is the preferred personal
equilibrium and is equal to the consumption optimum. However, for z 2 [200=(3+);50], both
alternatives are equilibria. Interestingly, the riskless equilibrium Z is then always preferred
to the risky equilibrium Y , because U(Y jY ) < U(ZjZ) for z 2 [200=(3 + );50]. This result
is surprising, because Y rather than Z is the consumption optimum for z 2 [200=(3+);50].
This result reects bias of the model against risky alternatives. The risky personal equilibrium
yields negative gain-loss utility because the decision maker is assumed to derive negative gain-
loss utility from the situation where Y pays 0, while the reference point pays 100, a situation
that has zero probability of occurring since the reference point equals Y .
The purpose of this example is to demonstrate the divergence between the preferred
personal equilibrium and the consumption optimum under simplifying assumptions. In a
real-life choice experiment, many subjects would deviate from the consumption optimum in
the example by choosing the riskless alternative even if it has the lowest expected outcome
(for example, z = 45). One possible explanation for these choices is that the subjects do
not endogenously select their reference point, but simply x it at, for example, their normal
hourly wage, introducing loss aversion. An alternative explanation is probability weighting,
which generally is strong even for fty-fty gambles and introduces a \certainty eect".
To account for this eect, we may use a rank-dependent consumption utility model as the
benchmark. Using the same reasoning as in the example, the reference-dependent model
would then predict a stronger aversion to the risky alternative than the consumption model.
The preferred personal equilibrium characterizes risk preferences before making an an-
ticipated risky choice. K oszegi and Rabin (2007) also introduce the concept of choice-
acclimating personal equilibrium (CPE) to describe risk preferences after the choice has
been made. The CPE maximizes reference-dependent utility U(ZjZ) over all risky prospects
11rather than over personal equilibria (as in Denition 2.2), that is, the CPE corresponds to
X 2 argmaxfU(ZjZ) : Z from Xg. This paper focuses on pre-choice risk preferences and
the preferred personal equilibrium. However, it follows directly from Proposition 3.2 below
that the post-choice CPE in our framework simply reduces to the consumption optimum,
that is, X 2 argmaxfM(Z) : Z from Xg.
3 The State-dependent Reference Point Model
We deviate from K oszegi and Rabin (2006) in two ways: (i) we use a more general set of
admissible reference points and (ii) we replace the disappointment-based preference structure
with a state-dependent, regret-based structure. The analysis deviates from Sugden (2003)
model with a xed state-dependent reference point, be allowing the reference point to be
selected endogenously.
Thus far, it was assumed that all feasible prospects are admissible reference points,
and vice versa. We now consider a more general specication where the set of admissible
reference points is a subset of all feasible prospects, Y  X. In our analysis, there is no
need to consider non-feasible prospects X = 2 X. However, for other purposes, it may be
useful to allow for, for example, an optimistic \utopia prospect" or a pessimistic \dystopia
prospect" as the reference point. It seems plausible that Y would depend on the decision
maker's initial subjective valuation of the prospects and therefore the specication of Y will
be discussed after introducing our preference structure.
In the spirit of regret theory, we consider the following alternative, state-dependent struc-
12ture:
Denition 3.1. Let Y  X. For a risky prospect X 2 X and an admissible reference point
Y 2 Y, the state-dependent reference-dependent utility of X given Y is dened as




where HX;Y (x;y) = P[X  x;Y  y] is the joint cumulative distribution function of X and
Y , and u is dened as in Equation (2.2).
The state-dependent model evaluates the outcome of the prospect and the reference point
at their joint probabilities, rather than the product of the marginal probabilities, and thus
also incorporates the statistical dependence between the prospect and the reference point.
In case of a discrete probability distribution with S states of nature, this boils down to
comparing the outcomes of the prospect with those of the reference point in the same state
of nature and not with outcomes in other states:




Using a state-dependent reference point, the decision maker does not experience negative
gain-loss utility (disappointment) from the fact that bad states yield worse outcomes than
good states, as Equation (2.3) would predict. Rather, she derives negative gain-loss utility
(regret) when the chosen prospect falls below the reference point in the same state.
If two random variables X and Y are independent, then the joint cumulative distribution
function of X and Y is the product of the corresponding marginal distributions:
HX;Y (x;y) = FX(x)FY(y):
13In this case, the two specications of reference-dependent utility coincide:
(3.9) ~ U(XjY ) =
Z Z
u(xjy)dFY(y)dFX(x) = U(XjY ):
However, the two models generally diverge if the prospect and the reference point are de-
pendent. Compared to the state-dependent model, the K oszegi and Rabin (2006) model
generally overestimates the true joint probabilities of gains or losses in case of positive de-
pendence between X and Y and underestimates the joint probabilities in case of negative
dependence. In fact, the decision maker may even experience illusionary gains and losses
that have a zero probability of occurring. In contrast to the disappointment specication, the
regret specication is not invariant with respect to the dependence structure. We formalize
this observation using the concept of positively and negatively associated random variables.
Denition 3.2. Two random variables X and Y are said to be positively associated if
Cov(f(X);g(Y ))  0
for every pair of non-decreasing functions f and g such that the above covariance exists.2
Negative association holds if the above inequality is reversed.
Using the state-dependent function, decision makers generally have a preference for
prospects that are positively associated with the reference point and an aversion to prospects
with a negative association:
Proposition 3.1. Let (X;Y ) 2 X  Y be a pair of prospects and consider a second pair
of prospects ( ~ X, ~ Y ) with same marginal distributions as the rst pair, i.e., F ~ X  FX and
F~ Y  FY, and such that ~ X is independent from ~ Y . If u satises assumption A30 then
14(i) ~ U(XjY )  ~ U( ~ Xj~ Y ) if X and Y are positively associated.
(ii) ~ U(XjY )  ~ U( ~ Xj~ Y ) if X and Y are negatively associated.
The following example illustrates the implications of Proposition 3.1:
Example 3.1. We assume the same setup of Example 2.1. Assuming a perfectly positive
dependence, the relevant values of expected reference-dependent utility are
~ U(Y jY ) = 50;






(0   0) +
1
2
(101   100) = 51
and X is preferred to Y . However, assuming a perfect negative correlation, expected state-








(0   100) +
1
2
(101   0) =
100
2
(2   ) + 1
and the loss averter prefers Y to X0 in order to avoid the loss situation (Y (2);X0(2)) =
(100;0).
By accounting for the dependence structure, the inherent aversion to risky prospects dis-
appears:
Proposition 3.2. ~ U(Y jY ) = 1 M(Y ) for all Y 2 Y and therefore ~ U(Y jY ) = ~ U(c(Y )jc(Y )).
Similar to Proposition 1.3 in K oszegi and Rabin (2006), but under more general condi-
tions, if a prospect is preferred to the reference point, then the same preference relationship
holds if the prospect is taken as reference point:
15Proposition 3.3. Let X;Y 2 Y with P[X 6= Y ] > 0. If ~ U(XjY )  ~ U(Y jY ) then ~ U(XjX) >
~ U(Y jX).
This result motivates the following denitions of state-dependent personal equilibrium
and state-dependent preferred personal equilibrium:
Denition 3.3. A element Y 2 Y is a state-dependent personal equilibrium given Y (SPE)
if
~ U(Y jY )  ~ U(XjY )
for all X 2 Y. We denote the set of state-dependent personal equilibria in Y by YSPE.
A state-dependent preferred personal equilibrium given Y (SPPE) is a risky prospect Y 2
YSPE such that
Y 2 argmaxf~ U(ZjZ) : Z 2 YSPEg:
Note that for a SPE we restrict the condition ~ U(Y jY )  ~ U(XjY ) to hold only for
prospects X in Y, i.e., only for admissible reference points. Therefore, in our setting, the
(S)PPE generally diers from the optimal prospect, while in K oszegi and Rabin (2007) the
decision maker selects a PPE as both the reference point as well as the optimal prospect
given the reference point.
Recall that the disappointment-based model and the regret-based model generally dier,
even if Y = X, unless the prospect and the reference point are statistically independent.
Therefore, the stochastic model and the state-dependent model generally yield dierent sets
of personal equilibria and dierent preferred personal equilibria. This occurs even when all
prospects are statistically independent, because the denition of personal equilibrium re-
quires auto-evaluation { a case with perfectly positive dependence. The following example
16shows that not every state-dependent personal equilibrium is a personal equilibrium:
Example 3.2. We assume the same setup of Examples 2.1 and 2.2 (thus we also assume
Y = X). The state-dependent model computes the reference-dependent utilities as follows:
~ U(Y jY ) = 50 +
1
2
(0   0) +
1
2
(100   100) = 50
~ U(ZjY ) = U(ZjY ) = z +
1
2
(z   0) +
1
2
(z   100) =
1
2
(3z + z   100)
~ U(Y jZ) = U(Y jZ) = 50 +
1
2
 (0   z) +
1
2
(100   z) =
1
2
(200   z   z)
~ U(ZjZ) = U(ZjZ) = z:
Therefore Y is a state-dependent personal equilibrium (~ U(Y jY )  ~ U(ZjY )) if ~ U(ZjY ) 
50, or z  100(1 + )=(3 + ). Similarly, Z is a state-dependent personal equilibrium
(~ U(ZjZ)  ~ U(Y jZ)) if ~ U(Y jZ)  z, or z  200=(3 + ). Thus, for z < 100(1 + )=(3 + )
and z > 200=(3+), there exists a unique state-dependent personal equilibrium, which equals
the state-dependent preferred personal equilibrium and the consumption optimum. However,
for z 2 [200=(3 + );100(1 + )=(3 + )], we have two state-dependent personal equilibria
and the state-dependent preferred personal equilibrium is the consumption optimum. By
contrast, Example 2.2 shows that for z 2 [50;100(1 + )=(3 + )] the risky prospect Y is
not a personal equilibrium. In contrast to Proposition 2.1, the example also shows that a
riskfree state-dependent personal equilibrium is not necessarily a state-dependent preferred
personal equilibrium. Indeed, for z 2 [200=(3 + );50] the riskfree prospect Z is a state-
dependent personal equilibrium, but not a preferred personal equilibrium. Table 1 summarizes
the comparison given in Examples 2.1, 2.2 and 3.2 between the stochastic reference point
model and the state-dependent model.
Under the general assumptions about risk preferences used thus far, we can also nd
examples where not every personal equilibrium is a state-dependent personal equilibrium.3
However, if we impose more structure on risk preferences, such examples are excluded, and
every personal equilibrium is a state-dependent personal equilibrium:
Proposition 3.4. Suppose that m is bounded and  satises assumption A30. Then every
personal equilibrium in Y is a state-dependent personal equilibrium, i.e., YPE  YSPE.
17While comparison across states of nature generally moves the PPE away from the op-
timal solution to the reference-independent choice problem, the SPPE generally equals the
consumption optimum:
Proposition 3.5. Let Y 2 Y be a state-dependent preferred personal equilibrium and let
1 > 0.
(i) Y 2 argmaxfM(Z) : Z 2 YSPEg.
(ii) Under assumption A30, Y 2 argmaxfM(Z) : Z 2 Yg. Moreover, any prospect in
argmaxfM(Z) : Z 2 Yg is a SPPE.
Loss-aversion in our model generally does not aect choice behavior if the reference point
is completely endogenous and adjusts immediately to new information or unexpected events
(i.e., Y = X). The decision maker is then free to select any choice alternative and reference
point, and she may select the consumption optimum for both. This combination maximizes
both components of expected reference-dependent utility: (i) the consumption optimum by
denition maximizes expected consumption utility and (ii) expected gain-loss utility achieves
its maximal value of zero in case of auto-evaluation. Thus, the reference-dependent solution
equals the consumption optimum when the reference point is completely endogenous. Given
the wealth of evidence showing that loss aversion aects choice behavior, this nding suggests
that the reference point generally includes an important exogenous component. In our model,
this means that only a subset of the feasible prospects is considered as a candidate reference
point (i.e., Y  X).
We now turn to the specication of the set of admissible reference points, Y. Without
18claims to generality, the following specication is suciently exible for our purposes:
(3.10) Y = fX 2 X : c(X;X0)  c0g:
In this specication, X0 2 X is an external reference point that may reect, for example,
a past reference point or a past solution from a previous decision problem, in case of repeated
decision making. For an investor who considers rebalancing her portfolio, the current port-
folio composition, or the solution to her previous rebalancing problem, could represent an
external point of reference. Alternatively, X0 may be an external benchmark that is imposed
by a principal or an external advice or a social norm. For example, for a money manager,
the external reference point could be a general market index or a customized benchmark
portfolio specied by a client. The function c measures the subjective adjustment cost or
mental eort of deviating from X0. It seems plausible that the costs would decrease with the
experience and education of the decision maker and the available decision time and decision
support tools. For a given decision maker and decision problem, the adjustment costs would
seem to depend on the \economic distance" between a candidate reference point X and the
initial reference point X0. One possible specication is:
(3.11) c(X;X0) = ~ U(X0jX0)   ~ U(XjX0):
In this case, the adjustment costs of a candidate reference point X depends on its \initial
value," or the reference-dependent utility given the initial reference point X0. The initial
19value captures the decision-maker's prior subjective judgement regarding the prospects. T<he
mental cost of considering a candidate reference point is higher if the initial value is lower.
Loss aversion lowers the initial valuation and hence increases the adjustment costs and
shrinks the admissible set. c0 measures the maximum admissible adjustment costs. Setting
c0  maxfc(X;X0) : X 2 Xg yields the extreme, unrestricted case with Y = X, or the
situation that was considered by K oszegi and Rabin (2006). In the extreme case of c0 = 0,
the decision maker would consider only alternative reference points that improve the initial
valuation. Such reference points represent obvious improvement possibilities that can be
detected even without changing the reference point. Still, the decision maker would avoid all
reference points with less salient improvement possibilities { ones that can only be detected
after rst updating the reference point. If X0 already maximizes the initial valuation (and
is a unique solution), then X0 is also a state-dependent preferred equilibrium in X and the
reference point is in eect completely xed, as in the Sugden (2003) model. Apart from being
xed, X0 could also take a non-stochastic, constant value, as in the traditional interpretation
of the reference point, for example, in Prospect Theory.
As discussed above, loss-aversion in our model generally does not aect choice behavior if
the reference point is completely endogenous, that is, Y = X. However, more generally, loss
aversion increases the mental eort required to adjust the reference point and may exclude
some prospects from consideration. Loss aversion introduces a preference for solutions that
have a positive correlation with the initial reference point (and involve relatively low adjust-
ment costs) and an aversion to negative correlation. The decision maker generally deviates
20from the general consumption optimum in order to reduce her exposure to losses relative to
her initial reference point. Prospects that are positively correlated with the initial reference
point will look more attractive, because these involve smaller losses and lower adjustment
costs than uncorrelated or negatively correlated prospects. This is consistent with the pre-
diction of K oszegi and Rabin (2007) that a prior expectation to take on a risk will decrease
the willingness to pay for insurance against that risk.
While loss aversion generally causes deviations from the unrestricted consumption op-
timum, its eect is limited to excluding certain prospects and it does not introduce new
candidate solutions:
Proposition 3.6. Let Y  X be dened as in Equation (3.10) for some c0 2 R, where c is
the cost function given in Equation (3.11). Then under assumption A30, a state-dependent
personal equilibrium given Y is a state-dependent personal equilibrium given X, i.e., YSPE 
XSPE.
Thus, the preferred state-dependent personal equilibrium given Y will always be one of
the state-dependent personal equilibria of the unrestricted case.
4 Empirical application
We analyze historical returns to the one-month US Treasury bill (\bills"), the US common
stock market index constructed by the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) of
the University of Chicago Booth School of Business (\stocks") and 50/50 mixtures of bills
and bonds (\mix funds"). We consider returns with a daily, weekly, monthly and annual
frequency. The sample includes the daily, weekly and monthly returns from July 1, 1963 to
21April 30, 2010, and the yearly returns from 1963 to 2009, a total of 11,789 daily observations,
2,444 weekly observations, 562 monthly observations and 47 annual observations. Returns
are evaluated in excess of the T-bill rate, so that the bills have an excess return of zero and
are assumed to be completely risk free. The T-bill series are from Ibbotson Associates; the
stock series are from Kenneth French' online data library.
As in the examples in the main text, we assume risk-neutral, linear consumption utility
(m(x) = x) and use a piecewise-linear gain-loss utility function ((x) = x if x  0 and
(x) = 2x if x < 0). We also considered other specications, including risk averse, logarith-
mic consumption utility (m(x) = ln(100+x)) and the Tversky and Kahneman (1992) value
function (x) = x if x  0 and (x) =  ( x) if x < 0, using the Tversky and Kahne-
man (1992) parameters ( = 0:88,  = 2:25). However, the specication of the preference
parameters proved to be less important than the specication of the reference point and the
choice of the return frequency.
We use the historical returns as equally likely states-of-the-world. We estimate the ex-
pected consumption utility and gain-loss utility using the sample average over all states.
These averages are then used to identify the personal equilibriums and preferred personal
equilibriums. Given the high average excess return to stocks, it is not surprising that the
consumption optimum is to invest in stocks for every return frequency in our sample. Since
the excess returns on bills is always zero, consumption utility of bills is always zero too.
Stocks and mix funds by contrast have positive consumption utility on average.
To account for sampling error, we estimate the probability that stocks, bills and mix funds
22represent a personal equilibrium or a preferred personal equilibrium using bootstrapping.
We generate 10,000 pseudo-samples through random sampling with replacement from the
original sample, and compute average consumption utility and gain-loss utility in every
pseudo-sample. Next, we compute the fraction of the pseudo-samples where stocks, bills or
mix funds represent a personal equilibrium or a preferred personal equilibrium. The results
suggest that the full-sample results are robust to sampling variation.
The rst four columns of Table 2 show results for the disappointment-based model of
K oszegi and Rabin (2006).
For daily and weekly returns, investing in bills is a personal equilibrium. When the
reference point equals the riskless rate, investing in bills looks more attractive than investing
in stocks or mix funds. Consumption utility and gain-loss utility of bills are always zero and
hence average reference-dependent utility equals zero. Stocks and mix funds have positive
consumption utility, but the large possible losses (disappointment) relative to the riskless rate
introduce negative average gain-loss utility, and reference-dependent utility takes a negative
value on average.
Investing in stocks is not a personal equilibrium for daily and weekly returns. According
to the model, stocks may cause losses even to investors who use stock returns as their
reference point. A prospective stock investor is assumed to be afraid that stocks would go
down, while the reference point goes up, a situation that will of course never occur when
stock returns are the reference point. For example, the largest weekly \loss" in the sample
occurs by comparing the stock market return of minus 18.40 percent in the week of October
236-10, 2008 with the stock market return of plus 16 percent in the week of October 7-11,
1974. For this reason, bills and mix funds achieve a higher average reference-dependent
utility than stocks if stock returns are the reference point. Similarly, mix funds are not
a personal equilibrium, because bills look more attractive than mix funds when mix fund
returns are the reference point.
For monthly returns, all three asset classes are a personal equilibrium. Thus, every asset
class is optimal for investors who benchmark against the returns of that asset class. However,
the reference point is endogenous and the investor selects the preferred personal equilibrium,
or the personal equilibrium with the highest expected reference-dependent utility. Since bills
yield a zero expected reference-dependent utility and stocks and mix funds yield negative
values, bills are the preferred equilibrium.
Thus, for daily to monthly return frequencies, the preferred personal equilibrium is bills
and does not equal the optimal solution to the investment problem - stocks. The prefer-
ence for bills reects the inherent aversion to risky choices that was discussed in Section
2; while bills by denition yield zero gain-loss utility when compared to the riskless rate,
auto-evaluation of stocks and mix funds yields negative gain-loss utility.
For annual returns, stocks are the only personal equilibrium. Bills and mix funds are not
personal equilibriums; stocks look more attractive than bills and mix funds when the riskless
rate or mix fund returns are the reference point.
The last four columns of Table 2 show results for the regret-based, state-dependent
model, which avoids comparing outcomes across states-of-the-world and focuses on within-
24state comparison only. We rst assume full endogeneity for the reference point, or c0 = +1
and Y = X; we will consider binding adjustment costs below. The regret-based model is
identical to the disappointment-based model when the prospect or the reference point is
riskless; dierences arise only when the prospect and the reference point are both stochastic.
Hence, the two models yield identical utility levels for bills, stocks or mix funds relative to
the riskless rate and bills relative to stock or mix fund returns. However, evaluating stocks
or mix funds relative to stock or mix fund returns now makes stocks and mix funds look
more favorable.
For daily, weekly and monthly returns, each of the three asset classes is a state-personal
equilibrium. Since holding stocks or mix funds avoids possible losses (regret) relative to
that asset class, gain-loss utility is zero and reference-dependent utility equals consumption
utility and is positive on average - in contrast to the negative values for the K oszegi and
Rabin model. The preferred personal equilibrium in this case is stocks, or the consumption
optimum. For annual returns, the preference for stocks is even stronger; bills and mix funds
are not even a personal equilibrium.
The above results illustrate that loss aversion does not aect optimal choice if the state-
dependent reference point is fully endogenous. We now turn to the case with an exogenous
initial reference point and binding adjustment costs. Table 3 summarizes the results for the
extreme case with c0 = 0, that is, the investor allows only adjustments of the reference point
that improve the initial valuation. The initial reference point X0 could be set at bills, stocks
or mix funds. We will rst discuss the results for X0 =bills.
25For daily, weekly and monthly returns, bills are a personal equilibrium over X and hence
maximize the initial valuation. Therefore, bills are the only admissible reference point, or
Y = fbillsg, and hence the preferred personal equilibrium. For annual returns, however,
stocks and mix funds achieve a higher initial value than bills and also represent admissible
reference points, that is, Y = fbills, stocks, mix fundsg. Thus, in eect, this is the unre-
stricted case from Table 2, and stocks are the preferred state-dependent personal equilibrium.
These results show how costly adjustment can cause deviations from the consumption
optimum. If the reference point is xed at a target rate-of-return, loss aversion will aect
investment by making bills appear more attractive to myopic investors with a relatively short
investment horizon.
We have thus far assumed X0=bills. If we assume that the initial reference point is
stocks, or X0=stocks, the preference for stocks is even stronger than in the unrestricted case
of Table 2, and stocks are the preferred equilibrium for every return frequency. If we set
X0 =mix funds, we nd results that are comparable to those for X0 =bills; mix funds are the
preferred equilibrium for weekly to monthly returns, but stocks are the preferred equilibrium
for annual returns.
5 Conclusion
While the typical implementation of reference-dependent choice theories exogenously xes
the reference point at a given constant, recent research has dealt with the possibility that
the reference point is a random variable and that the reference point is endogenously de-
26termined as part of the decision maker's optimization problem. We add to this literature
by examining loss aversion with a state-dependent reference point. The model essentially
extends the Sugden (2003) model for an exogenous stochastic reference point to the case
where the reference point is endogenous (in part or in whole), and it modies the K oszegi
and Rabin (2006) model by changing the underlying reference-dependent preference struc-
ture from \disappointment-based" to \regret-based" and allowing for exogenous component
in the reference point.
The K oszegi and Rabin (2006) model compares every possible outcome of the prospect
with every possible outcome of the reference point, as in disappointment theory. The decision
maker experiences losses when the outcome of the prospect in a given state falls below the
outcome of the reference point in other states. She is indierent to the statistical dependency
between the prospect and the reference point. Comparing across states also introduces an
aversion to risky prospects, which yield negative gain-loss utility (disappointment), even in
the case of auto-evaluation. This aversion generally moves the preferred personal equilibrium
away from the decision maker's consumption optimum. For example, in our empirical appli-
cation, investors are predicted to invest in riskless bills, while investing in stocks maximizes
their expected consumption utility.
The state-dependent reference point model leads to dierent results. The decision-maker
experiences negative gain-loss utility (regret) when the prospect falls below her reference
point in the same state. Therefore, prospects are more attractive if they depend positively
on the reference point and are less attractive in case of negative dependence. The state-
27dependent model is neutral in the sense that it avoids an inherent aversion to risky prospects
and yields no loss when the prospect and the reference point are the same. In addition,
an related to this, the model ensures that the preferred personal equilibrium equals the
consumption optimum, when the reference point is fully endogenous.
In the state-dependent model, loss aversion inuences behavior only if the decision maker
is not free to select the consumption optimum as her reference point. Given that loss aver-
sion is widespread, we conclude that the reference point generally includes an important
exogenously xed component or adjust slowly to new information or unexpected events. A
case in point is an investment benchmark index that is externally xed by the investment
principal for the duration of the investment mandate. Our model captures this exogenous
component using costly adjustment from an initial, exogenous reference point. The xed
state-dependent reference point of Sugden (2003) arises the special case with prohibitive ad-
justment costs, provided the decision maker cannot improve upon the initial reference point
without updating the reference point.
Further research could focus on the dynamics of a stochastic reference point - how does
it originate and how quickly does it adjust to new information or surprise events? Does
the adjustment speed depend on, for example, problem presentation, decision time and
experience? Another interesting research topic is probability weighting. Does probability
weighting aect consumption utility in the same way as gain-loss utility? Does it aect
the probabilities of the evaluated prospect, FX, in the same way as the probabilities of the
reference point, FY?
28Notes
1Assumption A30 implies that (x;y) 7! u(ujy) is supermodular. A function  : R2 ! R
is supermodular if for all (x1;y1);(x2;y2) 2 R2 we have
(minfx1;x2g;minfy1;y2g) + (maxfx1;x2g;maxfy1;y2g)  (x1;y1) + (x2;y2):
On R2, supermodularity is equivalent to the property of having increasing dierences, i.e.,







m(y0)   m(y) ;x  y  y0
(   1)m(x)   (m(y)   m(y0)) ;y  x  y0
(m(y0)   m(y)) ;y  y0  x:
is nondecreasing in x for all y  y0.
2Note that each random variable X is positively associated with itself (Joe 1997, Lemma 2.1).
Moreover, two random variables X and Y are positively (negatively) associated if and only
if they are positive (negative) quadrant dependent, i.e.,
HX;Y (x;y)  ()FX(x)FY(y)
for all x;y 2 R2 (see Joag-Dev and Proschan 1983, Property P1).
3Let 
 = f1;2;3g and P[fsg] = 1
3 for s = 1;:::;3. We dene the risky prospects X and
Y as follows:
X(1) = 111:1;X(2) = 100;X(3) = 89
Y (1) = 110;Y (2) = 100;Y (3) = 90:
Suppose that m(x) = x, (x) = 1   exp( 0:1x) if x  0 and (x) = 20(exp(0:01x)   1)
if x < 0 (the index of loss aversion is  = 2), and 1 = 2 = 1. Then XSPE = fXg while
XPE = fX;Y g. The example exploits the dierent curvatures of the value function over gains
and losses. We use a piecewise-exponential function, since a piecewise-power function with
dierent powers for gains and losses violates assumption A2, as demonstrated in K obberling
and Wakker (2005).
29A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2.1
Let Y 2 X then




































= 1 M(Y ) + 2
Z Z
z>y
[(m(y)   m(z)) + (m(z)   m(y))] dFY(z)dFY(y)
= 1 M(Y ) + 2
Z Z
z>y
[( (m(z)   m(y))) + (m(z)   m(y))] dFY(z)dFY(y):
The second term vanishes if Y is riskless. If Y is stochastic, i.e., P[Y = a] < 1 for all a 2 R,
and since m is strictly increasing, we have
Z Z
z>y
[(m(y)   m(z)) + (m(z)   m(y))] dFY(z)dFY(y) < 0
by property A2. This proves the statement of the Lemma.
30A.2 Proof of Proposition 2.1
Without loss of generality 2 > 0. Let
GL(ZjY ) = (1=2)(U(ZjX)   1 M(Z))
be the gain-loss utility. If 1 = 0 the statement is clear, since GL(ZjZ)  0 for all Z 2 X.
Let 1 > 0. We prove the statement by contradiction. Assume that X = x is not a PPE.
Then it exists Z 2 XPE with
U(ZjZ) > U(XjX):
It follows:
U(ZjX) = 1 M(Z) + 2 GL(ZjX) = 1 M(Z) + 2 GL(ZjZ)   2 GL(ZjZ) + 2 GL(ZjX)
= U(ZjZ) + 2 (GL(ZjX)   GL(ZjZ))
> U(XjX) + 2 (GL(ZjX)   GL(ZjZ)):
If we prove GL(ZjX) GL(ZjZ)  0, then U(ZjX) > U(XjX), a contradiction to X 2 XPE.
The following properties are satised:
(i) M(Z) > M(X).
(ii) There exists z0 2 supp(Z), such that z0 > x.
We rst prove these two properties:
(i) M(Z) = (1=1)(U(ZjZ)   2 GL(ZjZ))  (1=1)U(ZjZ) > (1=1)U(XjX) = M(X).
31(ii) Suppose that for all z0 2 supp(Z) we have z0  x. Then x  Z almost surely and
therefore M(X) = M(x)  M(Z) since M is monotone. This contradicts property (i).
Thus property (ii) holds.
Property (i) implies:



























Under assumption A30 we have



























Therefore GL(ZjX)  GL(ZjZ) and thus U(ZjX)  U(XjX), a contradiction to X 2 XPE.
This prove the statement.
32A.3 Proof of Proposition 3.1
Christodes and Vaggelatou (2004) show that if X and Y are positively associated then
E[(X;Y )]  E
h
( ~ X; ~ Y )
i
for every supermodular function  : R2 ! R such that the expectations exist (we say that
the pair (X;Y ) dominates the pair ( ~ X; ~ Y ) by supermodular order). The inequality sign is
reverted in the latter equation if X and Y are negatively associated. Under Assumption A30
the function  : (x;y) 7! u(xjy) is supermodular. Consequently,
~ U(XjY ) = E[(X;Y )]  E
h
( ~ X; ~ Y )
i
= ~ U( ~ Xj~ Y )
if X and Y are positively associated. Similarly,
~ U(XjY )  ~ U( ~ Xj~ Y )
if X and Y are negatively associated.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3.2







since d2FX(minfx;yg) = 0 for x 6= y. Therefore, the gain-loss utility is zero and this proves
the statement.
33A.5 Proof of Proposition 3.3
Let X;Y 2 Y, then
~ U(Y jX) + ~ U(XjY ) =





























Property A2 implies that ( (m(x) m(y)))+(m(x) m(y)) < 0 for all x 6= y (also using







and this proves the statement.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 3.4
Let Y 2 YPE. If Y is riskless, than the statement is obvious since U(ZjY ) = ~ U(ZjY ) for
all Z 2 Y. Therefore we assume that Y is stochastic (and thus its cumulative distribution
function is not degenerated).
34Let Z 2 Y. If Z is riskless, then
~ U(ZjZ)  U(Y jY )  U(Y jY ) = ~ U(ZjY );
and Z is not preferred to Y if Y is the reference point. Therefore, we also assume that Z is
stochastic (and thus its cumulative distribution function is not degenerated).
Let Z be a random variable with the same marginal distribution of Z, and Y and Z
have joint distribution minfFY(x);FZ(y)g (it corresponds to the upper Fr echet bound; see
Joe 1997). By Property (2.4), U(ZjY ) = U(ZjY ).
Let  : (x;y) 7! u(xjy). Since  is continuous, bounded and supermodular, then by
Tchen (1980, Corollary 2.2)
~ U(Z
jY ) = E[(Z
;Y )]  E[(Z;Y )] = ~ U(ZjY ):
Therefore, if we prove that ~ U(ZjY )  ~ U(Y jY ) then also ~ U(ZjY )  ~ U(Y jY ), and the
statement follows. For the sake of simplicity, we denote Z by Z.










From this property and assumption A30, for any x;y 2 R we obtain:










where g(t;y) = 1 + 2 y(t),
y(t) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
 ;y > t
1 ;y  t
;
35and  > 1 is dened in A4.
Let ~ Y and ~ Z be independent copies of Y and Z, i.e., ~ Y and ~ Z have the same marginal
distributions of Y and Z, respectively, and are both independent from Y and Z. Using the
formula for (x;y)   (x0;y), we have:
( ~ Z;Y )   (~ Y ;Y ) =
Z
R
(1f ~ Z>tg   1f~ Y >tg)g(t;Y )dm(t)
(Z;Y )   (Y;Y ) =
Z
R
(1fZ>tg   1fY >tg)g(t;Y )dm(t):
We take the expectations and we apply Fubini's theorem; it follows:
U(ZjY )   U(Y jY ) = E
h









(FY(t)   FZ(t))E[g(t;Y )] dm(t)





(1fZ>tg   1fY >tg)g(t;Y )

dm(t):
Using that g(t;Y ) = 1 +2 1fY >tg +2 1fY tg we derive the expected values of g(t;Y ) and
(1fZ>tg   1fY >tg)g(t;Y ):

















~ U(ZjY )   ~ U(Y jY ) =
= U(ZjY )   U(Y jY )   2(   1)
Z
R
[(FY(t)   HY;Z(t;t))   (FY(t)   FZ(t))FY(t)]dm(t):




> > > <
> > > :
(FZ(t)   FY(t))FY(t) ;FY(t)  FZ(t)
(FY(t)   FZ(t))(1   FY(t)) ;FY(t) > FZ(t)
:
Thus ~ U(ZjY )  ~ U(Y jY ) and since this is true for all Z 2 Y, Y is a state-dependent
personal equilibrium, i.e., Y 2 YSPE.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 3.5
(i) Follows directly from the denition of SPPE and Proposition 3.2.
(ii) Let Y be a SPPE and suppose that there exists W 2 Y such that M(W) > M(Y ).
Without loss of generality, we take W 2 argmaxfM(Z) : Z 2 Yg. Let V 2 Y, then
M(W)  M(V ). Under assumption A30, the function  is concave, thus by Jensen's
inequality we have:
E[(m(V )   m(W))]  (E[m(V )   m(W)]) = (M(V )   M(W))  0:
Therefore,
~ U(V jW) = 1 m(V ) + 2 E[(m(V )   m(W))]  1 m(V )  1 M(W) = ~ U(WjW);
37i.e., W is a state-dependent personal equilibrium given Y. By (i), the SPPE has
maximal consumption utility over the set of SPE's given mathcalY , which contradicts
M(W) > M(V ). This also shows that W 2 argmaxfM(Z) : Z 2 Yg is a SPPE given
Y.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 3.6
Assume that Y 2 YSPE but Y = 2 XSPE. The we nd X 2 X n Y such that
~ U(XjY ) > ~ U(Y jY ):
If 2 = 0, the statement is clear.




(~ U(ZjW)   1 M(Z))
for all (Z;W) 2 X  Y.
It follows:
~ U(XjX0)   ~ U(Y jX0) =
= 1 M(X) + 2 ~ GL(XjX0)   1 M(Y )   2 ~ GL(Y jX0)
= 1 M(X) + (2 ~ GL(XjY )   ~ GL(XjY ))
| {z }
=0
+2 ~ GL(XjX0)   1 M(Y )   2 ~ GL(Y jX0)
= ~ U(XjY )   ~ GL(XjY )) + 2 ~ GL(XjX0)   ~ U(Y jY )   2 ~ GL(Y jX0)
= ~ U(XjY )   ~ U(Y jY ) + 2 ( ~ GL(XjX0)   ~ GL(XjY ))   ~ GL(Y jX0))
 2 ( ~ GL(XjX0)   ~ GL(XjY ))   ~ GL(Y jX0))
38The latter inequality follows since ~ U(XjY ) > ~ U(Y jY ).
Moreover, from Denition 3.1, it follows
~ GL(XjX0) = E[(m(X)   m(X0))] = E[(m(X)   m(Y ) + m(Y )   m(X0))]:
Under Assumption A30,  is super-additive, i.e., (x + y)  (x) + (y) for all x;y 2 R. It
follows:
~ GL(XjX0) = E[(m(X)   m(Y ) + m(Y )   m(X0))]
 E[(m(X)   m(Y )) + (m(Y )   m(X0))]
= E[(m(X)   m(Y ))] + E[(m(Y )   m(X0))]
= ~ GL(XjY ) + ~ GL(Y jX0):
Therefore
~ U(XjX0)   ~ U(Y jX0)  2 (tildeGL(XjX0)   ~ GL(XjY )   ~ GL(Y jX0))  0
and ~ U(XjX0)  ~ U(Y jX0). This implies that X 2 Y. A contradiction to Y 2 YSPE.
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CO Y Y Z Z
PE Y Y;Z Z Z
PPE Y Z Z Z
SPE Y Y;Z Y;Z Z
SPPE Y Y Z Z
Table 1: The table shows consumption optimum (CO), personal equilibria (PE), preferred
personal equilibria (PPE), state-dependent personal equilibria (SPE) and state-dependent
preferred personal equilibria (SPPE) for a risk neutral decision maker who face the choice










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































44Daily Weekly Monthly Yearly
X0=Bills
Y = fBillsg 1.000 1.000 0.915 0.169
Y = fBills, Stocksg 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Y = fBills, Mix Fundsg 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Y = fBills, Stocks, Mix Fundsg 0.0000 0.000 0.085 0.831
X0=Stocks
Y = fStocksg 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Y = fStocks, Billsg 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Y = fStocks, Mix Fundsg 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Y = fStocks, Bills, Mix Fundsg 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
X0=Mix Fund
Y = fMix Fundsg 1.000 1.000 0.915 0.169
Y = fMix Funds, Billsg 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Y = fMix Funds, Stocksg 0.000 0.000 0.085 0.831
Y = fMix Funds, Bills, Stocksg 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table 3: The table shows the results from the applying state-dependent utility model to
daily, weekly and monthly excess returns of bills, stocks, and mix funds with 50% stocks
and 50% bills from July 1, 1963, to April 31, 2010, and yearly returns for 1963-2009. We
assumed a risk neutral consumption utility (m(x) = x) and a piecewise-linear value function
((x) = x for x  0 and (x) = 2x for x < 0). The set of admissible reference points
corresponds to Y = fX 2 X : c(X;X0)  c0g, where c(X;X0) = ~ U(X0jX0)   ~ U(XjX0)
and c0 = 0. The table reports bootstrap results. We generated 10,000 pseudo-samples
through random sampling with replacement from the original sample, and computed av-
erage reference-dependent utility in every pseudo-sample. For every initial reference point
X0 2 fBills, Stocks, Mix Fundsg we computed the fraction of the pseudo-samples where the
set of admissible reference points corresponded to Y reported in the rst column for the
corresponding values of the exogenously given reference point X0. The SPPE given Y is
bold-faced. The stock series are from Kenneth French' online data library; the T-bill series
are from Ibbotson Associates.
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